

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

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LIMITATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF PARLIAMENT AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE RULE OF A BALANCED POWER. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS1

Jacek Zaleśny, Jarosław Szymanek

Poland

Annotation. The present text reviews and assesses the establishment and development of constitutional review of bill. Concentrations on the consequences of this process take place which follow from the special importance of the bill as a parliamentary act identified with the expression of the sovereign's will. The origin of the process of constitutional review of bill and its main stages are analyzed and the accompanying political controversies are also explained.

Keywords: formation and development of control over the constitutionality of laws, European countries, law as an act of parliamentary, balance of power.

Introduction

Control over the legislative activity of parliament is regarded in contemporary states as a constitutional standard: an indispensable and obvious condition of the protection of the citizens' rights and freedoms against the risk of parliament's unconstitutional activity. The need to introduce this kind of assessment was expressed at the end of the 18th century. It was formulated in connection with the shaping of modern parliaments created on the basis of the contemporary understanding of the sovereign's political representation, the increasing importance of political fractions and in connection with the spread of the right to vote for parliament. It was believed that the legislative activity of the parliament should be checked for its compatibility with the fundamental laws of the state. Nevertheless, the establishment of this kind of control encountered obstacles for a long time. The first and the most important was the opinion that parliament, as the representative of the will of the sovereign themselves, could not be subject to any control since that would indirectly mean controlling the nation itself, which would in turn undermine the latter's sovereign character. That – for principal reasons – could not be accepted. The entity which was to control the compatibility of bill with the constitution was to posses a similar political legitimacy to that of the creator of the bill. *De facto* this condition was only fulfilled by parliament itself and the only legitimized form of controlling the bill was parliamentary self-control (A.S. Sweet, p. 83).

Another arguments that was frequently used against controlling the legislative activity of parliament was the position of parliament in the structure of state bodies. In the classical constitutional law this position was exceptional, which was explained by its representative nature and the fact that it does not express its own will but the will of the sovereign nation. It was believed that if expressing this will was to be complete and effective at the same time, the organ which expressed it – which is parliament – had to occupy the dominating position among all other organs constituting the so-called state apparatus. In some systems, for example in France or Great Britain of the 19th c., this point of view went even further since treating the parliament as the highest, and hence the most importance organ of the state ultimately generated the rule of the parliament's sovereignty, in accordance with the idea that "there is no will but the will of the

[1] The article is written as a part of NCN (National Science Centre Poland) project: «Constitutional courts in post-Soviet states: between the model of a state of law and its local application» (id 2016/23/B/HS5/03648).

parliament", which was at that time supported by the absence of the institution of direct democracy. As a consequence, the standard procedure was a lack of any reviewing procedures and the will of the parliament, expressed for example in the content of a law, was not subject to anybody's control. This construction was complemented by the definition of a law, according to which the latter was "a manifestation of common ill", which even more obviously did not encounter any barrier, for instance in the form of reviewing procedures.

With time, however, it was acknowledged that the activity of the parliament should also be limited by reviewing procedures. It was rightly argued that departing from absolutism should be followed by the establishment of verifying mechanisms also in relation to parliament. Parliaments were also noticed to be the source of threats for civil rights and freedoms. As said by James Madison during the work on the American constitution, and those were not only his reflections, an individual, a group as well as a few hundred deputies of the legislative might be the absolute tyrant if there was no verifying and restraining instance above it.

Discussion. A more and more articulated postulate to introduce a controlling mechanism as a consequence generated the correction of the legislative procedure including the reviewing mechanisms. Consequently, the parliament was still a monopolist and its legislative activity was not controlled by anybody from the outside. However, from the theoretical point of view it was a significant change since the law adopted by the parliament was perceived not only as an expression of the common (sovereign's) will but also as an effect of reviewing activities which were aimed at assessing whether the legislative procedure was observed and whether the content of the law was compatible with the top-down accepted assumptions (treated either as the common will, as the sense of justice or as the activity in accordance with the reason of state or, finally, as the activity compatible with the constitution).

The concept of parliament's legislative self-control took shape in this way. According to it, if the parliament finally accepted the bill, at the same time it acknowledged that it was correctly adopted from the procedural point of view and that it was correct from the material point of view (considering the content). This was first of all connected with restricting and specifying the statutory conditions of the legislative process, which for this reason required, for example, more and more detailed norms and increasingly more stages on the level of parliamentary work (work in commissions, work during the plenary sittings of the chamber). Secondly, the concept of parliament's self-control caused a re-orientation of the political status of the second chamber of parliament, which since then started to be perceived the chamber having a special duty to take care about the quality of the law established by parliament. As a result, the second chamber began to be called the "reviewing chamber", "the chamber of legislative restraint", "the control chamber", or "the chamber of reflection and prudence", with the characteristic division of tasks of both chambers becoming a spontaneous reason for a two-chamber parliament. The task of the first chamber was to adopt the law in a definite shape, while the second one was to control it in formal and material respects. The law finally accepted by parliament was perceived not only as an act of will of the sovereign, represented by parliament, but also as acompleted, legally "perfect" act, also in the sense that it corresponded to the requirements of constitutional correctness.

However, certain objections were raised to the so-formulated concept of controlling parliament's legislative rights. One of the basic and most frequently formulated ones was that control organized in this way was in fact self-control, which in turn, undermined its objective character. It was observed that it violated the rule *nemo iudex in causa sua* (no one ought to be a judge in his own cause), which led the critics of this situation to the conclusion that as long as control is self-control, it is actually no control. Moreover, the insufficient professionalism of parliamentary control and its mainly political character was pointed out. It was also indicated that in the basic system marking the rhythm of parliamentary work, i.e. government – opposition,

legislative control is by definition ineffective in a sense since the parliamentary opposition, by being the parliamentary opposition, can only criticize while the ruling majority will do what they wish.

It is worth emphasizing that although the model of self-control was abandoned later, some of its solutions remained. The first is the assumption that in spite of the fact that at present the organ controlling the legislative activity is situated outside the parliament, in the procedures of their regulations the chambers still have an obligation to establish such solutions whose aim is marked by the control of the adopted law from the point of view of its compatibility with the constitution. The second one is the correlated concept of legislative duties of the parliament. According to this concept, two kinds of duties are laid on the parliament, namely 1) so-called positive obligation, coming down to the order to develop and specify constitutional regulations, which takes place mainly through the establishment of laws, largely aimed to make the indications of the constitutional more precise, and 2) so-called negative obligation, consisting in a ban on establishing a law incompatible with the constitution. The third solution, which remains after the former competence of the parliament to self-control the law it established itself, is the rule adopted today of presumed constitutionality of the laws. In accordance with it, the law passed by the parliament is treated as being compatible with the law of a higher rank until this compatibility is questioned by another organ (e.g. constitutional court) equipped with the right for legislative assessment of the activity of the chamber (chambers).

The wave of criticism encountered by the parliamentary model of control (self-control) of the legislative activity gave rise to a search for another kind of mechanisms of effective (i.e. objective and possibly professional) verification of legislative activities of the chambers. Their assumption was to place the controlling entity outside the parliament. Chronologically, the first such proposition was put forward in 1795 in France in the times of the revolution by Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (during constitutional work). He suggested entrusting constitutional control of the laws to the elite *Constitutional Jury* (*jurie constitutionnaire*). It was supposed to be a separated and independent organ of the state. The first composition of the *Jury* was to be chosen by parliamentary deputies from among themselves. Every year the *Jury* was to resign. The choice of their successors was to be made by the *Jury* from the among the deputies finishing their term of office. The *Constitutional Jury* was first of all expected to investigate the constitutionality of the acts of public authority and then repeal those that were not compatible with the constitution (J. Szymanek; M.M. Wiszowaty). It was also supposed to play the role of the law-maker through formulating propositions of amendments to the constitution in order to guarantee its inner coherence. E. J. Sieyès was aware that the control of legislation was not a typically judicial activity, which is why he proposed to call the organ which he suggested should be established a *jury* and not a *court.* He saw that it was the activity with political consequences. Therefore, the organ performing it is placed between the powers. It has the features of a court, it concerns legislation and in its consequences it influences the constitution, that is law making. E. J. Sieyès' project was criticized and rejected as threatening the rights of the Convent. As argued by Antoine Claire Thibaudeau: "This monstrous power would be first of all in the state. Giving the public authorities a guard would mean giving them a master who would bind them to have a better watch on them" (G. Burdeau, p. 374).

Although the concept of a constitutional jury as seen by Sieyès was not realized, the problem of dangers associated with the risk of the parliament's legislative arbitrariness remained. Therefore, it was decided that the proper solution was to grant the control of laws to the head of state, which was reflected in the institution of the promulgation of a law. The activities of the head of state, entitled to sign the law and have it announced in an official publication was perceived in the categories of checking whether the law accepted by the parliament fulfilled the proper requirements. The disputable issue, however, was to establish the criteria of the review of the law by the head of state. It was undisputable that before signing the law and directing it for

publication, the head of state could assess whether it was adopted with all the procedures kept (referring to the constitution, the laws and the rules and regulations). The so-called formal (procedural) control was then obvious. However, the dispute referred to whether the head of state had the competence of substantive verification (pertaining to the content). Finally, it was decided that the head of state controlled only the procedural aspects of the law established by the parliament and, in case they decided the procedures were violated, they could direct the law to the parliament again to be passed once more, thus repairing all possible procedural shortcomings taking place when it was accepted originally. At the same time, it was settled that there was no possibility to assess in the promulgation act the compatibility of the content of the law with the constitution, if only because passing the law again was not after all connected with introducing any new content to it.

The control of the legislative activity of the parliament performed by the head of state was highly appreciated. It was thought that it was definitely better than the model of the parliament's self-control practiced earlier and that was for a few reasons. Firstly, because it stopped being a self-control. Secondly, while realizing the controlling competences, the head of state, who were expected to be politically impartial, behaved, or at least were supposed to behave in an objective way, which improved the effectiveness of the control. Thirdly, it provided good doctrinal basis for the presence of the head of state in the process of the law coming into effect. It deserves to be remarked that a trace of this doctrinal reinterpretation of the head of state's presence is the function of the guard of the constitution still ascribed to the head of state which goes back to the times when the head of state was seen as the controller of the parliament's legislative activity. Nevertheless, the control by the head of state also had its significant drawbacks. The most important was its fragmentary character and the fact that beyond its area it left out the material (objective) aspect of the controlled acts, which *de facto* meant only a partial control. Another disadvantage was a lack of professionalism. Still another was the objection that the Republican head of state (at that time most frequently coming from the election by the parliament) did not necessarily have to be a really impartial and fully objective organ. Referring to the Republican head of state from the parliamentary election it was pointed out that it was not an organ completely independent from the parliament (which was well highlighted by the 3rd French Republic) and that another entity should be rather sought which would control legislative acts adopted by the chamber (chambers) better. That was so even more because while acting as the promulgating organ, the head of state was involved in the legislative process, which – according to the critics of this situation – still kept the internal character of that control in the sense it took place within the legislative process the monarch or the president was an integral part of. It was for this reason why still another controlling mechanism was sought.

In the first three decades of the 20th century it was stated that such an ideal solution would be to entrust the control over the parliament's legislative activity to courts or other bodies similar to the former in political respects. That was first of all because it placed the controlling body beyond the legislative process, in addition to assuming its full professionalism. It was also of importance that courts were equipped with the attribute of a separate and independent power, which guaranteed full objectivism of its controlling activities. Certain experiences were provided by the American practice (where the model of judicial constitutional review by courts began to be executed since the middle of the 19th c., especially by the Supreme Court), with the doctrine of constitutional law developing on the European ground also having its share.

Hans Kelsen (A.A. Klishas, p. 104), who formulated a theoretical model of constitutional court which he believed was the optimal solution to the issue of the constitutionality of laws[2], had special merits in the establishment of an external model of the parliament's legislative

[2] One should also remember abort the earlier concept by Georg Jellinek, which accepted the relation between constitutional review of law with limitation of the parliament's power and which bound the review of laws with the mechanism of the protection of minority.

activity. It assumed that otherwise than in the American mode, the control of the parliament's legislative activity should not be given to common courts but that it should be granted to one special body of the state called the name of a constitutional court or tribunal (which was supposed to emphasize the profile of its activity similar to that of the court). Although H. Kelsen used the word «court», it needs to be emphasized that he did not treat the constitutional court like any other court. It was only supposed to give the sense of independence of activity, especially so because H. Kelsen realized that the area of activity of that organ was evidently political (L. Favoreu, p. 56). Hence, instead of speaking of the constitutional court (*cour constitutionnelle*) he often spoke of the political court (*cour politique*) since he perceived the activity of that court consisting in assessing the law-making activity of the parliament as political activity. For Kelsen, an additional element which made the constitutional court an evidently political organ was the way of appointing it, which either assumed appointment of its members by the parliament or at least by the parliament cooperating with another organ (e.g. the head of state).

The constitutional court, or the state's organ bearing another name and performing the function of the court, was supposed to be a special, political organ of the state which was supposed to exercise control over the legislative activity of the parliament in accordance with the principle of exclusiveness. What is more, in case the constitutional court found out the unconstitutionality of the examined law, its principal idea was to be repealing the faulty regulation. In H. Kelsen's opinion, this was to be the manifesttaion of the essense and originality of the the court in relation to the earlier forms of control over the law-making activity of the parliament. Nevertheless, H. Kelsen himself added that what should give the constitutional court the most important specific feature was also what made it a political organ even in a bigger degree. In addition, the issue of the possible derogation of the laws *nolens volens* made it transform into a law-making body, but acting in a specific manner consisting in repealing and taking out the laws from the system of the binding norms of law. That is why H. Kelsen called the constitutional court a „negative legislator" (*législateur négatif*), and he divided all law-making activity into that of positive character (performed by the parliament since the latter introduced new norms into the system) and that of negative character (realized by the constitutional court; the statement of unconstitutionality brought the effect of derogation).

H. Kelsen's idea was considered to be the "prototype" of the European model of the constitutionality of law (A.S. Sweet, p. 83). In the inter-war period it was in part realized in practice. Constitutional courts were provided for in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Spain. After World War II constitutional courts were already considered standard and today they are functioning in the majority of democratic countries (G.Kh. Nuriyev) although in many of them a dispute is going on about the range of rights belonging to the constitutional court and its political status (the point is mainly about their legitimacy and the judicial or non-judicial character). In some countries where the constitutional court has not been appointed according to H. Kelsen's concept, control over the legislative activity of the parliament was given to special organs (e.g. the French Constitutional Council, the Kazakhstan Constitutional Council), all common courts, or possibly the highest instances of common or administrative courts (USA, Belgium, Greece, Scandinavian countries).

Conclusion. Summing up, now it is assumed that the control of the parliament's legislative activity is of complex character involving a number of entities. This means that the following have their part in this control: 1) parliament, which – in the course of the legislative procedure – should provide for special solutions directed at checking the compatibility of law with the constitution; 2) head of state, who – as the guardian of the constitution – should also check whether the law adopted by the legislative refers to the constitutional standards; 3) constitutional courts (or other organs similar to them), which assess the constitutionality of laws and, additionally – in H. Kelsen's model – can decree on the loss of their binding force and take them

out from the system of norms. However, before that happened, for about 150 years the parliament was recognized as the sovereign power whose acts, on the one hand, should be compatible with the supreme law and, on the other, should not be submitted to non-parliamentary control of compatibility with it.

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IRSTI 10

FEATURES OF DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF POWER

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Annotation. The article is devoted to the issues of vesting local governments with separate state powers of the Russian Federation, as well as vesting local governments with separate government powers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. It is noted that, speaking about the form of vesting local governments with separate state powers, one cannot ignore the requirements presented by the legislator to the federal law and the law of the subject of the Russian Federation, through which this vesting is carried out.

Key words: state power, public authority, local self-government, law, municipal authority, state powers, competence of subjects, rights of citizens, state intervention, power.

Introduction

The general theory of state and law understands state power as the essence of the state, in turn, the essence of state power can be considered those legally significant actions that are carried out in the prescribed manner by state bodies within their competence. This provision, subject to certain terminological amendments, can be used to disclose the essence of municipal authority; it consists of legally significant actions committed by local authorities in the prescribed manner within their competence.

Taking into account the complexity of the system of public authority in Russia as a federal state (two levels of state power and independent, not reducible to state, local government), we take a special view of the problem of the features of delegation of authority between different levels of government. For its analysis, we highlight the main problematic aspects: vesting local authorities with separate state powers of the Russian Federation; vesting local governments with separate state powers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

The constitutionally fixed (part 2 of article 132 of the Constitution of Russia) the possibility of vesting local governments with separate state powers of the Russian Federation is specified in Chapter 4 of the Law “On General Principles of Local Government Organization” dated October 6, 2003 No. 131-FZ, part 2 of Art. 19 of the Law says that the vesting of local governments with separate state powers of the Russian Federation is carried out by federal laws and the laws of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, while the vesting of local governments with separate government powers by other normative legal acts is not allowed. The law, therefore, is the only possible form of vesting local governments with separate state powers. This rule is confirmed by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Russia of November 30, No. 15-P.

Discussion

M.Yu. Dityatkovsky, examining the legal and technical aspects of the norms that determine the procedure for vesting local governments with separate state powers, discovers a sufficient number of debatable provisions, in particular, the dispositively formulated norm of

Part 2 of Art. 132 of the Constitution of Russia causes ambiguous interpretation and provokes the law enforcement officer to violate the legal form of vesting with state powers, exercising it through, for example, by-laws. Although in the literal interpretation of Part 1 of Art. 132 of the Constitution of Russia should proceed from the fact that the word "may" does not refer to the form of vesting, but to the possibility of vesting as such.

Speaking about the form of vesting with individual state powers, one cannot ignore the requirements of the legislator to the federal law (the law of the subject of the Russian Federation), through which this vesting is carried out. They are listed in Part 6 of Art. 19 of the Law of October 6, 2003. In accordance with part 6.1 of the same article, the law of the subject of the Russian Federation, providing for the vesting of local authorities with state powers of the Russian Federation, transferred for implementation to the state authorities of the subject of the Russian Federation, must contain a number of additional provisions. However, the issue of the right of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to establish additional requirements to the laws of the constituent entities on the vesting of local governments with separate state powers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation has not been resolved.

According to M.Yu. Dityatkovsky, this right arises only when it comes to vesting with those powers that, in accordance with the Constitution of Russia, belong to the exclusive competence of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. In general, this position seems sufficiently convincing.

The empowerment of local governments with separate state powers is a constitutional relationship, which means that it reveals in itself all the elements inherent in this theoretical structure. The object of this legal relationship, as follows from the general meaning of constitutional norms, is the authority of state bodies, as well as the material and financial resources necessary for their implementation. Moreover, the transfer of these funds is a legal obligation of the state body entering into this relationship. In turn, the right of local governments to demand the transfer of these funds corresponds to the obligation to use them for their intended purpose (provided for in paragraph 8 of Article 19 of Federal Law No. 131-FZ). Actually, the transfer of certain powers and their material basis entails the emergence of a constitutionally guaranteed right for the transferring entity to exercise control measures over the exercise of powers and the expenditure (or use) of the transferred material resources. We talked about this type of control earlier.

Local self-government bodies exercise their powers to the extent established by law. In addition to a specific list of issues of local importance, the competence of local governments also includes individual state powers delegated to municipalities in a strictly defined order. However, if there is a mechanism for delegating certain state powers to local authorities, then (and this logically follows from the general principles of public authority activity), the reverse mechanism should also be provided for by law - a mechanism for transferring certain powers of local governments to state bodies. The Law "On General Principles of the Organization of Local Self-Government" provides for the procedure for the temporary exercise by state authorities of certain powers of local authorities (Article 75). As can be seen from the text of this article, the legislator presumes the exclusivity of the application of measures of state intervention in resolving issues of local importance, this norm establishes a closed list of cases in which this intervention is possible:

1) if, in connection with a natural disaster, catastrophe, other emergency, the representative body of the municipality and the local administration are absent and (or) cannot be formed;

2) if, as a result of decisions, actions (inaction) of local self-government bodies, overdue debts of municipalities arise for the fulfillment of their debt and (or) budgetary obligations, exceeding 30 percent of own revenues of budgets of municipalities in the reporting financial year, and (or) overdue debts of municipalities on the fulfillment of its budgetary obligations,

exceeding 40 percent of budgetary appropriations in the reporting financial year, subject to the fulfillment of budgetary obligations of the federal budget and the budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation with respect to the budgets of these municipalities;

3) if in the exercise of certain transferred state powers due to the provision of subventions to local budgets, local self-government bodies committed improper spending of budget funds or a violation of the Constitution of Russia, the Federal Law, and other regulatory legal acts established by the relevant court.

Conclusion

I must say that article 75 of the Constitution of Russia also provides for a number of mechanisms for protecting the rights of local authorities against abuse of state bodies, among them the limitation of the scope of interference of state bodies, the right to judicial appeal of their actions, limitation of time, the establishment of a list of requirements for regulatory acts introducing these restrictions.

In accordance with Part 2 of Art. 75 in the cases established by clause 1 of part 1 of this article, the decision on the temporary exercise by the executive bodies of state power of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation of the relevant powers of local authorities is made by the highest official of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation on the basis of a decision of the representative body of local self-government or a decision of the legislative (representative) body of the state authorities of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation, adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes of the established number of deputies.

It seems that this norm, in a sense, is in conflict with the fundamental principles of local self-government. If local self-government is understood as the right of citizens, then the restriction of this subjective right should be carried out in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of Russia, namely: only through the adoption of a federal law (part 3 of article 55 of the Constitution of Russia). It is clear that the establishment by the Law of October 6, 2003 of a simplified procedure for state intervention sets as its goal an early operational solution to the problem. However, it must be assumed that even the presence of an emergency does not justify a violation of basic constitutional principles.

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ОСОБЕННОСТИ ДЕЛЕГИРОВАНИЯ ПОЛНОМОЧИЙ МЕЖДУ РАЗЛИЧНЫМИ УРОВНЯМИ ВЛАСТИ

Аннотация. Статья посвящена вопросам наделения органов местного самоуправления отдельными государственными полномочиями Российской Федерации, а также наделения органов местного самоуправления отдельными государственными полномочиями субъектов Российской Федерации. Отмечается, что, говоря о форме наделения органов местного самоуправления отдельными государственными полномочиями, нельзя оставить без внимания требования, предъявляемые законодателем к федеральному закону и закону субъекта Российской Федерации, посредством которого и осуществляется это наделение.

Ключевые слова: государственная власть, публичная власть, местное самоуправление, закон, муниципальная власть, государственные полномочия, компетенция субъектов, права граждан, государственное вмешательство, власть.

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CONSTITUTIONAL-LEGAL STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AS SUBJECTS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

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Annotation: The article discusses the legal nature of the subjects of the institution of suffrage - political parties. The conceptual apparatus and the essence of the constitutional legal status of political parties as subjects of the electoral process of Russia are determined. It is noted that the main trend of modern Russian election legislation is related to the expansion of the foundations of participation of political parties in elections, not only at the federal, but also at the regional and municipal levels. Discusses the issues of the electoral process and the legal regulation of political parties.

Keywords: state power, public institutions, rights and freedoms, constitutional status, electoral process, suffrage, political party, subjects of law, electoral process, representative bodies.

Currently, in constitutional law science, the issue of determining and the elemental composition of the sectoral legal status of collective subjects of public legal relations, such as public associations and political parties, despite a lot of scientific work on this issue, continues to be debated. This is due both to the problematic scientific discussion regarding the category of "constitutional legal status" itself, and to the particularities of the status of political parties at the present stage.

It should be noted that the term «status» itself, as a legal category, can simultaneously mean both diverse phenomena (in this case, researchers supplement the definition with a specific term, obtaining several subspecies of the «status» category), or it can be considered as a complex-structured, multidimensional phenomenon.

In the scientific literature, this category was initially interpreted as a complex, sometimes dichotomous phenomenon that went beyond the summative system of legal rights and freedoms and legal duties, and implemented a set of structural elements, a list of which has been noted and grouped, and there are many disputes.

So, as an example of disputed elements, we will point out such as legal capacity, legal capacity, tort (so, this position is shared by N. A. Bogdanova, but not shared, for example, by L. B. Sobolev and others), guarantees of the exercise of rights and freedoms and etc. [3, p. 19]

The legal status of a party is a comprehensive collective category, reflecting its legal nature, place in the system of state and public institutions, rights and obligations, the ability to act as a subject of law, social relations, grounds for legal responsibility. Differentiation of the legal status of a political party may reflect its various facets - depending on the perspective of the study.

An analysis of the provisions of the federal laws «On Political Parties» and «On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right to Participate in the Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation» reveals the following varieties of special statuses: parties that have representation in the State Duma in the legislative (representative) government bodies of the

subjects Russian Federation; parties actually participating or not participating in elections; parties with the right to state funding, parties deprived of the right to free access to the media during elections, etc.

It should be noted that with the adoption of the Federal Law «On Political Parties», which unified the requirements for their organizational structure, excluding the possibility of creating regional and local parties, there were less varieties of the special status of political parties. However, the allocation of this category, in our opinion, is still legitimate.

The structure of the legal status of a political party includes its legal structure, fundamental rights and obligations that determine its constitutional and civil legal personality, legal responsibility, as well as legal relations of a general (status) type. The latter, in particular, include issues of interaction between the state and political parties, principles of activity of political parties, etc.

The essential features of a political party find their concise expression in its various definitions.

Moreover, there is no universally recognized definition of a political party in legal and political science. Among the many definitions of the party in world political science, the most widely used are electoral (J. Sartori and others), structural (M. Duverger, M. Ya. Ostrogorsky), functional (K. Lawson and others), structural and functional (S. Neumann).

Thus, a political party is understood to mean a temporarily stable organization that expresses the interests of a part of society and sets as its goal the struggle for power, characterized by statutory discipline, fixed membership, common values and corporate interests [2].

As notes S.E. Zaslavsky, various theoretical and methodological approaches to the definition of the concept of a political party are formed both by state lawyers and political scientists.

Of course, the scientific definitions of a political party, although they do not carry a normative burden, are reflected in the development and consolidation of the legal structure of political parties in normative acts. Moreover, in the course of its development, the concept of a political party is operationalized: it primarily reflects legally significant features, the presence or absence of which can be established with certainty [2, p. 85].

The impossibility of completely identifying the legal concept of a political party with the concepts formulated by the political and sociological sciences has been repeatedly noted in the latest studies on political parties, since «the translation of the relevant theoretical provisions into a normative act requires taking into account the specifics of legal regulation» [2].

We emphasize that a feature of the normative constitutional legal status of political parties is the possibility of normative regulation by both the federal legislator and the laws of the constituent entities of the federation (with regard to the participation of regional branches of political parties in elections in a constituent entity and in municipal elections in the constituent territory), as well as in individual allowed by the federal legislator and potentially possible from the point of view of the possibilities of the regional legislator, cases - and regulation by regulatory acts of local self-government.

So, despite the fact that at first glance with regard to the nature of political parties in Russia, it is impossible to go beyond the electoral approach, given the constant trend of the last decade to increase the role of parties in the public power system and power relations in general, and in the federal electoral process, in particular, taking into account the direct dependence on political parties of the very possibility of implementing certain electoral procedures, the fact that there are no obstacles to party monopoly at the regional level, the classical functional interpretation of the goals and functions of political parties is also found, which is the main component of party goal-setting «the pursuit of power, political hegemony domination».

The procedures for the participation of political parties in elections are sequentially functionally complicated and transformed in the direction of increasing the importance of parties in the formation of the institutions of state power of the Federation, while the level of «party discretion» in relation to a number of significant non-legally binding, but permissible election procedures (primaries) increases.

But growing in recent years, this value puts on the agenda a new question: the extent of permissible party influence in the claim to the title of democratic, legal system. This answer requires a consistent and comprehensive analysis of the laws and procedures that vest political parties with relevant rights and clarifies the impact of the implementation of these political rights on the political system in comparison with the impact of the realization of the political rights of non-partisan citizens, as well as other subjects of political and legal relations and public policy actors.

Note that in modern political and legal studies, a considerable number of approaches are known to define and define a «political party», and to identify its place and the place adequate to the democratic political regime in the political system and its role in certain significant legal procedures.

It should be noted that the current Russian legislation on the status of political parties, in a rather specific way, determines their general role, containing a very reduced legal definition; however, by analyzing the functions of parties in the political system and their most important responsibilities, the approach chosen by the Russian legislator to determine the role of political parties can be described as based on the so-called electoral approach (above, we have already mentioned the work of J. Sartori and others) [5]. This approach provides mainly an answer to the questions of the goal-setting of political parties.

Allowing ourselves some methodological liberty and appeal to reductionist methods, we note that, in fact, the analyzed approach can be reduced to the following statement: «the party's goal lies in the electoral sphere».

As a kind of special case of a functional approach to understanding the phenomenon of a political party, the electoral approach is embodied in the main provisions of Russian legislation, including the consolidation of a significant number of electoral procedures in which the participation of political parties and their regional branches is mandatory. Of great importance in analyzing the participation of political parties and their regional branches as participants in elections at the level of a constituent entity of the federation is the structural approach proposed in due time by M. Duverger.

It is applicable especially since in Russia there is a rather specific requirement for the presence and a certain number of structural units, and at the same time, regional political parties that are quite widespread in Europe and the USA are prohibited.

Thus, we proceed from the fact that the constitutional and legal status of a political party will be the normative provision established by the norms of constitutional legislation and the actual position of the political party in the public law sphere implemented through participation in constitutional legal relations, a specific level of implementation of constitutional legal goals, tasks and functions of a political party in the political system, a system of constitutional legal guarantees and constitutional responsibility of political parties and a specific level of social fulfillment of constitutional legal rights, duties, guarantees and responsibilities of a political party.

This definition contains a listing of the most important, in our opinion, elements of the constitutional legal status of political parties: goals, objectives and functions, the order of creation, structural change and liquidation, rights and obligations, guarantees of activity, responsibility.

Identifying the most important essential features of the constitutional and legal existence of political parties, the Constitutional Court of Russia in its Resolution of April 13, 2017 No. 11-P

«On the Case of Verifying the Constitutionality of Part 2 of Article 40, Parts 10 and 11 of Article 42 of the Federal Law» On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation», clauses 2 and 3 of part 1 of article 128 and part 10 of article 239 of the Code of Administrative Procedure of the Russian Federation in connection with the complaint of citizens Trunova and M.V. Yurevich «defines political parties as» the main collective subjects of the electoral process».

Indeed, according to paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Federal Law of July 11, 2001 No. 95-FZ «On Political Parties», it is parties in Russia that are «the only type of public association that has the right to nominate candidates (lists of candidates) for deputies and other elected posts in government bodies».

Thus, the most important component of such elements of the constitutional legal status of political parties as the goals of creation, tasks and functions will be the participation of political parties in the elections. And this, in turn, will determine the content of their rights and obligations, the composition and content of guarantee mechanisms, as well as the types, forms and content of liability.

Analyzing the role and purpose of political parties in the Russian election process, the Constitutional Court of Russia emphasized that «it is political parties that serve as the necessary institution of representative democracy, which in many ways ensures the participation of citizens in the political life of the country, the political interaction of civil society and the state, the integrity and stability of the political system, which predetermines their legitimization as electoral associations, mediating the exercise of the electoral rights of citizens and endowed, inter alia, with the right to nominate candidates (lists of candidates) during any election campaign».

Note that in the decision cited above, the Constitutional Court of Russia uses the category of «electoral legal status» to specify the constitutional and legal status of a political party as a subject of the electoral process, which follows from the objectives of constitutional normative control, not limited by the sectoral framework of constitutional law.

We note that the most important obligation (and, at the same time, the most significant right) of political parties arising from the semantic core of the content of the purpose-functional block is.

This is nothing more than participation in elections, and the obligation is formulated disjunctively: by listing (logical addition) of those types of elections, at least in one of which, and at least once, the political party is obliged to take part within the established term, which today is 7 years old.

At the same time, the right to participate in a political party in elections, including federal ones, is formulated conjunctively: a political party can take part in all the electoral campaigns listed in the article, without any restrictions when meeting the mandatory procedural requirements for such participation provided for in the legislation.

Summing up some of the results, we note that the status of a political party essentially represents the normative and actual position of a political party in the public law sphere, the party fulfilling the most important function - participating in elections, exercising the rights of the political party, which correspond to the guarantees of the political party, and fulfillment of duties, which correspond to different types of responsibility of a political party, while rights, liability and guarantees correspond to liability for violation of the law on political parties.

The constitutional and legal status of a political party, therefore, is a normative provision established by the norms of constitutional legislation and realized through participation in constitutional and legal relations, the actual position of a political party in the public law sphere, a specific level of realization of the constitutional legal goals, objectives and functions of a political party in political system, a system of constitutional legal guarantees and constitutional

responsibility of political parties and a specific level of social enforceability of constitutional legal rights, duties, guarantees and responsibilities of a political party.

Despite the fact that participation in elections is an essential part of the content of the constitutional legal status of political parties, and non-participation entails constitutional legal responsibility in the form of liquidation, a comparative analysis of Russian and foreign legislation shows the incompleteness of the imperative requirement for political parties to participate in elections (you can completely ignore parliamentary elections) allows the creation of client-parties and the long-term evasion of political parties from their most important socio-political and legal function - participation in elections, in connection with which it is necessary to consistently amend the current legislation on political parties in order to increase the imperativeness of the requirement to participate in elections, and, we emphasize - participation in elections to representative bodies of the state authorities.

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CRIMINOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES OF A TERRORIST ORIENTATION

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Annotation The article is devoted to the study of criminological factors for determining the conditions and circumstances of the Commission and concealment of criminal offenses of a terrorist nature, which are determined by the determinants of the formation and development of terrorism as a social and legal phenomenon. The use of criminological analysis to establish causal relations criminal offences of a terrorist nature contributes to a comprehensive, fully disclose the conditions and circumstances preceding the Commission of, conceal these criminal acts, United by a common focus on terrorism, to predict, diagnose conditions and circumstances, the subsequent actions of a criminal nature, to model these factors objectively-subjective nature to analyze the ensuing results and consequences. A systematic approach to identifying factors of a criminal nature and conflict is aimed at establishing incentive and regulatory mechanisms for a specific criminal situation that reveal the direction of criminal offenses of a terrorist nature. The establishment of incentive and regulatory mechanisms for criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation is determined by the analysis of the cause-and-effect relations of the formation and development of terrorism as a social and legal phenomenon.

Keywords: Terrorism. Countering terrorism. Determinants of terrorism. Criminological analysis. Establishing cause-and-effect relationships. Incentive-regulatory mechanisms.

Introduction Consideration of terrorism as a socio-legal phenomenon is due to the establishment of cause-and-effect mechanisms for their formation and development, which in the system, complex create favorable conditions for the development of effective methods and methods of countering them, taking into account all social, socio-psychological, socio-economic factors. That is, it should be noted that the development of effective methods and techniques of combating terrorism as a socio-legal phenomenon requires a systematic analysis of the causal determinants that contribute in the provision to prevent the use of effective methods: how to predict, diagnose conditions and circumstances, the development of action algorithms aimed at solving tasks of preventing, detecting, investigating criminal offences of a terrorist nature. The task of preventing the perpetration of criminal offences of a terrorist nature, is the dominant direction of counter-terrorism as a socio-legal phenomenon because of their public danger of encroaching on the national interests not of one state, and many States, because of the required collective security, taking into account national interests of each state under international law.

Therefore, consideration of the development of preventive measures in the fight against terrorism, which is of an international nature, is relevant and effective in the system of countering it as a social and legal phenomenon.

Setting goals and objectives Focus research on identifying effective mechanisms for the provision of counter-terrorism, development of methods and means of struggle due to the decision of the task of a systematic approach to uncovering causal relationships determining the formation and development of a framework of criminal offences of a terrorist nature.

In the mechanism of committing criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation, criminogenic situations are highlighted, the study of their factors and contributes to the development of effective methods aimed at prevention, the disclosure of cause-and-effect determinants that determine the solution of problems of preventing criminal events of a terrorist nature.

In this regard, the focus on conducting criminological analysis of criminal offenses of terrorist nature is justified, as it is the identification, investigation, use of criminological factors in the formation and development of terrorism as a socio-legal phenomenon, defines the search path directions counter, predicting, diagnosing, modeling objective and subjective factors of causation that effectively affect the process of disclosure, investigation and prevention.

History, research methods Criminological research in the field of studying the causality of a terrorist act has been conducted before, which also provides for the establishment of causal factors related to the conditions and circumstances of the Commission or concealment of a criminal act. However, in our view, a systematic approach to the study of the factors establishing cause and effect in correlation, of the interdependence of the conditions and circumstances preceding the Commission of a criminal act, at the time of committing, concealment of criminal acts and the ensuing, to the extent not covered not disclosed, which negatively affects the quality of the enforcement activities.

The author attempts to develop a methodology for preventing terrorism based on criminological research to identify the cause-and-effect factors of the formation and development of a criminal situation.

Results/discussion The legal regulation of the cause and effect of terrorism as a social and legal phenomenon is reflected in the law "on counteracting terrorism" Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated July 13, 1999 No. 416, article 10 specifies organizational measures to prevent terrorist activities, article 10-1 attention is paid to the information and propaganda counteraction to terrorism, which is a progressive direction that provides for the implementation of organizational and legal measures at the legislative level aimed at solving practical problems of preventing terrorism, carrying out preventive measures [1]. In other words, it should be noted that legal support for organizational and preventive measures is one of the dominant areas in the system of counter –terrorism.

The practical relevance of providing counter-terrorism systemically, comprehensively, taking into account all the defining features of terrorism as a social and legal phenomenon is reflected in the Law on National security of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 6, 2012 No. 527-1V, where terrorism is identified as one of the main threats to national security [2]. The law "On countering the legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime and the financing of terrorism" of August 28, 2009 No. 191-1V shows the mechanisms for financing terrorism, revealing the ways and directions of identifying and investigating sources necessary to solve the tasks of preventing, disclosing and investigating criminal offenses of a terrorist nature [3].

However, despite the legal regulation of public relations in the sphere of countering terrorism, it is necessary, based on the situational analysis of specific criminal offenses of a terrorist nature, to develop their methods of prevention, disclosure, and investigation.

Development of methods of preventing criminal offences of a terrorist nature linked with establishing causal relationships in the formation and development of terrorism as a socio-legal, socio-economic phenomenon, this approach helps fully, comprehensively to uncover, to learn all its mechanism, as the formation and development of causal relations is determined by socio-psychological, socio-economic, socio-political relations within the state and outside. The application and use of a systematic approach allows determining effective counteraction

mechanisms based on the study of objective and subjective factors that are revealed by the conditions and circumstances of the Commission or concealment of criminal offenses of a terrorist nature. That is a terrorist orientation, the establishment of such purpose to act for the preparation and organization of the Commission specific actions, determination of their causative-regulatory mechanisms, due to the study of the conditions and circumstances of criminal nature, determining the conditions and circumstances of the criminal situation.

Thus, the conditions and circumstances of a criminal nature in the Commission of criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation that are of a transnational nature are factors related to political instability in the state, which are a potential threat to the interests of the state, society and the individual.

Politicians correctly note that "political stability is the level of public support for the institutions; for the territorial integrity - a measure of the ability of the state centre implement decisions at the regional and local levels of government of the country; for national sovereignty - a state's degree of independence in the realization of national interests" [4].

Another important criminal factor is social instability, which is distinguished by the presence of social contradictions within the state, which creates conditions for the formation and development of social tension. Sociologists distinguish social stability as the dominant factor in the system of ensuring national security [5], which, of course, is a natural process that creates favorable conditions for solving practical problems. Social security, its instrumental role is to strengthen the security of the individual, society and the state.

So, research and analysis of the dynamics and nature of social contradictions, tracking social tension, is one of the directions of criminological research in the field of countering terrorism as a social and legal phenomenon. Therefore, in the development of methods for countering terrorism, the dominant direction is criminological research in the field of social contradictions, which determine the formation of a focus on terrorism, on the Commission of criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation.

In addition, it should be noted that one of the components of countering terrorism is the improvement of the socio-economic situation in the country. The socio-economic sphere, its weakening is carried out by the laundering of illegal income in a criminal way that creates conditions for the financing of terrorism, so the undermining of the economic basis is caused by the financing of terrorism. In this regard, the creation of an economic base and financial support for terrorism should be singled out as a criminogenic factor in criminal offenses of a terrorist nature. Scientists point to the sources of financing of terrorism: “income from various types of criminal activities characteristic of transnational organized crime, the relationship of sources of financing with the support of terrorist organizations, the international nature of financial transactions; a significant share of cash transactions in the implementation of financing; the use of charitable and other non-profit organizations in financing schemes” [6].

Preventive activities for the financing of terrorism are determined by a systematic approach to solving national security problems by strengthening the economic foundations. In other words, preventive activities are a system of organizational and preventive measures aimed at ensuring economic security by countering, first of all, the financing of terrorism.

The next mechanism that eliminates the criminogenic factors of terrorism is to ensure the spiritual security of society and the state, which also create conditions for the political and social stability of the state. It is necessary to emphasize the validity of the position of scientists who note that “the division of terrorism into “bad” and “good” naturally leads to its legitimization as a form of political struggle, which will have the most negative consequences. Despite the clear bias towards religious terrorism and, above all, Islamist terrorism, there should be no link between Islam and terrorist activities” [7].

Conclusion Criminological analysis of terrorism as a socio-legal phenomenon, taking into account the factors of socio-political, socio-economic nature, spiritual education, heritage,

contributes to a systematic comprehensive study of the cause-and-effect relations of the formation and development of criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation. Based on the above, the methodology of preventing terrorism, due to the development of effective methods and methods of organizing and implementing preventive and preventive measures, is related to the issues of criminological analysis of the cause-and-effect relations of the formation and development of terrorism.

Kazakhstani scientists on the basis of a comparative analysis of the legislation of RK and international, focused on the implementation of measures of organizational and legal measures "to ensure the extradition of fugitive bankers and other financial criminals with the return taken from the country's capital, initiation and participation in international events for closure of offshore areas; training in secondary and higher institutions of knowledge and skills of behavior in the Commission of terrorist acts, improving the norms of international legal acts and Kazakh laws on the prevention and fight against terrorism" [8].

The proposed organizational and legal measures are, of course, still relevant today, as they are providing means of preventive and preventive activities in the system of countering terrorism due to their impact on the formation and development of it as a socio-legal, socio-economic phenomenon.

The causal complex of terrorism is due to the establishment of the source of information and retrieval of information about preparing, committed, committed terrorist crimes, the mechanism of which is determined by the set of interactive actions aimed at committing, concealing and counter defined by stimulating regulatory processes, to the knowledge of these relations, objectively-subjective nature and it is necessary to conduct investigative activities. In turn, the conduct of operational search activities, which form the substantive basis for the identification and collection of primary information about all manifestations of terrorist crimes, is determined by an effective means of countering terrorism. Operational search activity, as a system of public and secret methods in the system of counter-terrorism, determines the methodology for preventing criminal offenses of a terrorist nature. The effectiveness of conducting and implementing operational search activities is determined by tactical and forensic support aimed at prevention, organizational and managerial preventive measures against terrorism and extremism, preventing the Commission of terrorist acts, hostage-taking, buildings, structures, etc. [9].

The system of organizational and legal means aimed at countering extremism also occupies a certain place in the methodology of preventing criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation, since terrorism and extremism, considered by us as a form and content, reveal the cause-and-effect relations of the formation and development of terrorism. This system focuses on the prevention of religious extremism, which is the incentive and regulatory mechanism for criminal offenses of a terrorist nature in Kazakhstan [10].

In addition, in the methodology for preventing criminal offenses of a terrorist nature for subjects of criminal activity, the role of women in the mechanism of Commission, concealment and counteraction should be highlighted. Therefore, the development of a system of organizational and legal measures, social and psychological measures is an effective mechanism in the methodology of preventing criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation [11].

Within the framework of this study, we have focused only on certain aspects that determine the methodology for preventing criminal offenses of a terrorist orientation, but are dominant. Further research is being conducted to improve effective mechanisms for ensuring national security by improving criminal policy in the system of countering terrorism. In the system of criminal policy, a significant role is played by the improvement of criminological policy aimed at developing methods for preventing criminal offenses of a terrorist nature.

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ТЕРРОРИСТІК БАҒЫТТАҒЫ ҚЫЛМЫСТЫҚ ҚҰҚЫҚБҰЗУШЫЛЫҚТАРДЫ КРИМИНОЛОГИЯЛЫҚ ТАЛДАУЫ

Түйіндеме Бұл мақала әлеуметтік-құқықтық құбылыс ретінде терроризмді қалыптастыру мен дамытудың детерминанттарымен негізделген террорлық бағыттағы қылмыстық құқықбұзушылықтарды жасыруға, оны жасаудың жағдайы мен мән-жайын анықтау үшін криминологиялық факторларды зерттеу сұрақтарына арналған болатын. Террористік бағыттағы қылмыстық құқық бұзушылықтардың себеп-салдарлық қатынастарын анықтау үшін криминологиялық талдауды пайдалану терроризмге бірыңғай бағыттылықпен біріктірілген осы қылмыстық іс-әрекеттерді жасау алдындағы жағдайлар мен мән-жайларды жан-жақты, толық ашуға, криминалдық сипаттағы кейінгі іс-әрекеттердің жағдайлары мен мән-жайларын диагностиканы, болжауға, орын алған нәтижелер мен салдарларды талдау үшін объективті-субъективті сипаттағы осы факторларды модельдеуге ықпал етеді. Криминогендік сипаттағы, жанжалды факторларды анықтауға жүйелі көзқарас террористік бағыттағы қылмыстық құқық бұзушылықтардың бағыттылығын ашатын нақты криминалдық ахуалдың қозғаушы-реттеу тетіктерін белгілеуге бағытталған. Террористік бағыттағы қылмыстық құқық бұзушылықтардың қозғаушы-реттеушілік тетіктерін белгілеу әлеуметтік-құқықтық құбылыс ретінде терроризмді қалыптастыру мен дамытудың себеп-салдарлық қарым-қатынастарын талдаумен негізделген.

Кілтті сөздер: Терроризм. Терроризмге қарсы іс-қимыл. Терроризм детерминанттары. Криминологиялық талдау. Себеп-салдарлық қатынастарын анықтау. Қозғаушы-реттеушілік механизмдері.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL COOPERATION OF THE NEW TURKIC COUNTRIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract. New Turkic countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) make a significant contribution to the development of the Eurasian space, so there is every reason to study in depth the heritage of the Turkic world, their role and place in modern international relations.

Key words: Turk world, geo-policy, Central Asia, international organization, security.

Introduction

The creation of a regional Turkic geopolitical bloc is still relevant. Alone, it is difficult for the Turkic States to become a subject of modern geopolitics and geostrategy.

In the history of the independent period of the three Turkic States of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan – there was an experience of regional cooperation in the military and political sphere. It should be noted that as early as January 1994, the leaders of three Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) signed an Agreement on the formation of the Central Asian Union (CAC), the goals of which were to create an economic space and ensure the security of the countries of this region. In the CAC in the first half of the 1990s, the main focus was on solving economic problems, although this Union was essentially a geo-economic and geopolitical system, characterized as a condition for increasing the security resource of integration subjects. And according to the Agreement on the establishment of the CAC organization (2002), these same States were to provide mutual support to each other in preventing the threat of independence, combating transnational crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and illegal migration, as well as cooperate on the creation of common transport and energy infrastructures, and conduct a coordinated policy in the field of border and customs control.

Three fraternal States-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan-took part in military cooperation and peace-keeping measures, including joint security of the Afghan-Tajik border with Russia and the creation of a Central Asian battalion. However, at the present stage, the integration of the Turkic countries of Central Asia, including the military and political ones, has encountered difficulties, objective and subjective. Some researchers suggest that States participating in integration processes do not define regional relations as priority due to the lack of objective prerequisites. (Саидазимова Г. 2006).

In short, in the global economic and political space, the Central Asian States do not act collectively, but rather autonomously and on an individual basis. (Алшанов Р., Ашимбаева А. 2011).

In these circumstances, the Turkic countries of the Central Asian region prefer to participate in international regional organizations with the participation of powers with more powerful potential, and an important role is assigned to the military-political aspect of cooperation. The fight against terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational

organized crime and other threats to stability and security is at the heart of the foreign policy of the Central Asian States.

Discussion

As we know, the decision of the Council of foreign Ministers of the CSCE member States on January 31, 1992 to join the CSCE along with Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Tajikistan, as well as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan marked the beginning of cooperation between the new Turkic States of Central Asia and Transcaucasia with the CSCE/OSCE. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the following stages of cooperation between Central Asian countries and the CSCE/OSCE are highlighted:

- 1992-1995 - establishment of cooperation in the regional context (the 1st stage of the evolution of relations between the Central Asian countries and the CSCE was largely tentative and introductory);
- 1996-2001-the OSCE is beginning to understand the strategic importance and value of the region, which is reflected in the opening of the Organization's" field presences " (i.e., representative offices) in each Central Asian Republic;
- 2001-2004 – the "war on terror" and the growing contradictions between Central Asia and the OSCE. (Боконбаева Ж.К. 2011).

In 2004, the Central Asian countries and the OSCE adopted the "Appeal of the CIS member States to OSCE partners". The address addresses the problems of OSCE reform in the following areas:

- strengthening the anti-terrorist direction in the functioning of the Organization;
- settlement of regional conflicts throughout the OSCE area;
- further improvement of the military-political, as well as full-fledged development of the environmental and economic dimension of the OSCE;
- a more balanced work of the OSCE in the humanitarian sphere, including the introduction by the ODIHR (Office for democratic institutions and human rights) and OSCE missions of common objective criteria for evaluating electoral processes throughout the OSCE area.

It is no secret that at the beginning of the new Millennium, relations between the OSCE and Tashkent deteriorated due to human rights violations in Uzbekistan. But at the same time, the next and long-awaited OSCE summit was decided to be held in Kazakhstan, which once again confirmed the trust of this authoritative organization to the new independent States.

From the CIS countries, the Republic of Kazakhstan managed to achieve a high level of relations with the OSCE. In 2003, Kazakhstan made a statement of its intention to run for the OSCE Chairmanship, which was supported by the CIS member States. In November 2007, the Council of foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating States decided to grant Kazakhstan the post of OSCE Chairman in 2010.

In 2008, a separate Permanent mission of Kazakhstan to the OSCE was opened, and this decision was dictated by the tasks of preparing and holding the chairmanship of Kazakhstan in the organization in 2010. This was the logical conclusion of a large and productive work of the state and recognition of the country's real achievements in building a democratic society with a liberal market economy. (Шаймуханова С.Д.2013).

During its presidency, the Republic of Kazakhstan put forward a military-political initiative to move from the concept of "security space" to the concept of"security community". In this vector, the OSCE activities under the chairmanship of Kazakhstan were aimed at resolving protracted conflicts. Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE has become a significant event in Kazakhstan's foreign policy, which it has undoubtedly used to assert itself as a regional leader, increase the country's international weight and improve the foreign policy position of the organization itself.

In 1992, the Republic of Azerbaijan joined the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, in 1993-the Paris Charter, and in 1999-the Charter of European Security, which are the main documents of the organization. It is clear that Azerbaijan is cooperating with the OSCE on the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in the field of democratization.

Turkmenistan joined the Final Helsinki act of 1975 in 1992. The OSCE center in Ashgabat operates in three main dimensions: military-political, economic-environmental, and humanitarian. Projects are also being implemented in the areas of security, combating organized crime and drug trafficking, and strengthening and managing borders.

By a decision of the OSCE Permanent Council of 23 July 1998, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) was given broad responsibilities for implementing cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic across the entire spectrum of mutual interests. According to the mandate of the OSCE Center in Bishkek, activities in the field of political and military cooperation are concentrated in three key areas: the development of political institutions, conflict prevention and the fight against terrorism. (Шаймуханова С.Д. 2015).

The accession of the Turkic States of the post-Soviet space to the OSCE membership has contributed to the formation of common principles of coexistence with European countries and the development of domestic and foreign policy. But at the same time, the role of other international and regional organizations in the multilateral diplomacy of the Turkic States is noticeably growing.

Relations between the Turkic countries of the post-Soviet space and the NATO bloc began immediately after these States gained independence. In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan became members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro - Atlantic partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997). The EAPC, as a multilateral mechanism, allows the Turkic countries to carry out a dialogue with the NATO member countries and the countries of the Eurasian space on the most pressing issues of international security. Participation in the annual Meetings of the EAPC foreign and defense Ministers is an important component of cooperation. All Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union joined the Partnership for peace (PFP) program in 1994.

As M. Starchak notes, with the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, Central Asia became a region of interest for the North Atlantic Alliance. The US and its NATO allies have requested and received support for their operation in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan has leased Manas airport. Uzbekistan also granted the right to fly over its territory and transit for the transport of NATO members ' personnel and supplies.

The Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union joined the NATO program "PFP planning and analysis Process" (Azerbaijan in 1997, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan in 2002, Kyrgyzstan in 2007). In 1996, Tashkent and NATO approved the first individual partnership Program (PIP), which allowed Uzbekistan to develop cooperation with the Alliance on a substantive basis. Since 2006, the Republic of Kazakhstan has also started cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Individual action plan of the partnership between Kazakhstan and NATO. The set of measures outlined in the programs cover the areas of training and equipping individual units of the Kazbat Armed forces according to NATO standards, training a special rescue team capable of taking part in international rescue and humanitarian operations, cooperation in border security, reforming the Armed Forces, as well as emergency civil plan In June 2009, NATO held a security Forum in Astana, which demonstrates the importance of Kazakhstan in the strategy of cooperation with post-Soviet countries. The Forum was attended by delegations from 50 EAPC and NATO countries and other countries. The Forum discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the situation in Afghanistan, and energy security issues.

In contrast to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan began to build armed forces on the model of NATO countries, i.e. military units were re-formed on the NATO model. However, Uzbekistan's

cooperation with NATO has not always been on the rise. For example, after 2005, due to disagreements over actions in Andijan, Uzbekistan suspended participation in EAPC meetings. However, in 2007, NATO and Uzbekistan resumed regular dialogue through the EAPC. Based on the Partnership for peace program, Uzbekistan has started developing practical cooperation with the Alliance in a number of areas, including training military personnel, combating terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other international threats.

Turkmenistan has joined some NATO programs, but unlike other Turkic countries, its cooperation with this organization is limited by the country's neutrality. At the same time, there has been some intensification of Turkmenistan's cooperation since 2007, when the Republic began participating in a pilot project of the NATO-Russia Council to train personnel in Afghanistan and Central Asia in anti-drug control methods. In the literature, it was reported that in 2008, Turkmenistan agreed to use its territory for logistical support of the International security assistance forces, and Alliance aircraft were able to land at military.

Kyrgyzstan cooperates with NATO in such areas as defense reform and training of officials, and civil emergency planning. As part of the planning and analysis Process, the armed forces were modernized and compatible with the Alliance forces in order to meet common challenges and participate in PIM exercises. Kyrgyzstan's participation in the Partnership for peace program involves sharing information on military planning and " developing military cooperation with NATO in order to increase its ability to support Alliance operations." This fact makes Kyrgyzstan a weak link in the collective security Treaty Organization. (Эйвазов Д. 2001).

There is an opinion in the literature that the inefficiency of the mechanisms for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict proposed by the UN and the OSCE is one of the reasons that pushed Azerbaijan to cooperate with NATO. At the same time, it is indicated that NATO, along with the possibility of resolving this conflict, is able to play a significant role in maintaining the military and political security of Azerbaijan. (Бекиев Ж. 2002).

On November 19, 2002, the Republic of Azerbaijan was admitted as an associate member of the NATO parliamentary Assembly. In July 2006, Azerbaijan and NATO officially opened the Euro-Atlantic center in Baku, which serves as the main information center for NATO. Cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan covers a fairly wide range of activities. But since 2011, the pace of cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan has declined sharply, as Baku joined the non-aligned Movement, which, as we know, unites countries that have declared non-participation in military-political blocs and groupings as the basis of their foreign policy.

Thus, it can be noted that the Turkic countries of the post-Soviet space consider partnership with NATO as one of the priority directions of their foreign policy in the field of security. Integration into the North Atlantic Alliance programs gives the Turkic CIS countries formal protection from NATO members. In turn, NATO considers the territory of the Turkic States (Central Asian and Transcaucasian regions) as one of the key areas of its strategy aimed at expanding its influence in these regions. NATO seeks to weaken Russia's role in the post-Soviet space and prevent the Turkic States of this region from merging with the Islamic world.

It should be noted that initiatives for common Turkic integration were put forward by the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. A. Nazarbayev, who at the summit Of heads of Turkic-speaking States in Antalya in 2006 made proposals for the creation of several common Turkic structures, in particular the Permanent body of Heads of Turkic-speaking States, the parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-speaking States and the Council of Elders. The result of successful implementation of N. A.'s initiatives. Nazarbayev was undoubtedly the signing by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey on October 3, 2009 in the Azerbaijani city of Nakhchivan of the Agreement on the establishment of the Council of cooperation of Turkic-speaking States(CSTG), which became the basis for the creation of the first in the history of the Turkic world interstate Association of Turkic-speaking countries, designed to strengthen the unity of the Turkic peoples.

The 1st CSTG Summit was held on October 21, 2011 in Kazakhstan. The 1st FTS summit also addressed issues of national and regional security, strengthening the international community's fight against acts of aggression that threaten peace and stability, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and global security, among a wide range of issues. The sides stressed the importance of the peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the process of political stabilization in Kyrgyzstan. They also expressed support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan and Iraq, ensuring the rights and freedoms of the entire population.

In January 2013, the Association of law enforcement agencies of the military status of Eurasia, consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia, WAS established in Baku. This event was regarded as the first step towards the creation of a pan-Turkist army – the "Army of the Great Turan" [8]. This DOES not imply the creation of unified security forces, which means that national formations or structures with the participation of Russia will have to deal with real threats in Central Asia. (Богатырев В.Б.2004).

Central Asian countries cannot ignore the role of Russia as a strategic and influential partner in the political arena. In the context of increasing threats in connection with the withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan, the role of the CSTO (collective security Treaty Organization) is being updated, in which Moscow undoubtedly plays an important role. The CSTO is the only multilateral structure in Eurasia that is engaged in creating a system of collective security for several post-Soviet States and has a military-political dimension.

Among the Turkic States, the CSTO includes Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1999 (as part of the collective security Treaty), Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan withdrew from the Treaty. In 2006, Uzbekistan's membership in the CSTO was restored. However, on June 28, 2012, Tashkent sent a note notifying the suspension of Uzbekistan's membership in the CSTO.

Initially, within the CIS, multilateral cooperation in the military and political sphere took place within the framework of the collective security Treaty (CSTO), which was signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. The increased terrorist threat in connection with the events of 11 September 2001 required the strengthening of the security structure in Central Asia. There was a question of transforming the CSTO into an international regional organization-the CSTO (2002). The creation of the CSTO can also be seen as a reaction of Russia to the expansion of NATO and the growth of US influence in the post-Soviet space.

Since 2004, the issue of the mechanism for peacekeeping activities of the collective security Treaty Organization has been developed. In 2006, a session of the CSTO SCB was held, at which the political Declaration On further improvement and increasing the effectiveness of the CSTO was signed. The Declaration contains tasks to adapt the organization to modern realities and to turn the CSTO into a multifunctional international security structure. Another important vector in the CSTO's activities is the formation of a unified migration and border policy.

Kazakhstan actively participates in the CSTO. Participation in the CSTO of Kazakhstan from a military point of view should be considered in terms of the emergence of asymmetric threats from its southern borders — international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration.

From a political point of view, Kazakhstan's membership in the CSTO consists in an effort to maintain special, friendly relations with its neighbors, primarily with Russia. That is, for Kazakhstan, membership in the CSTO, on the one hand, is an important condition for ensuring national security, and on the other hand, has significant non-military goals. In 2012, Kazakhstan chaired the CSTO. During this time, the Organization has carried out several major operations to detect and stop illegal migration, human trafficking and drug trafficking, as well as strengthening the military component. The military Committee introduced a system of collective response to conflicts. Kazakhstan has played a major role in countering the threats emanating from

Afghanistan. It was at the initiative of the Former President of Kazakhstan that the CSTO member States analyzed the situation in Afghanistan and prepared a plan for localization of threats based on the forecast.

In General, it should be noted that cooperation in the field of regional security is an unshakable foreign policy priority of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Today, Kazakhstan's role in all regional structures designed to help maintain stability, including the CSTO, is very high. Kazakhstan is one of the most stable countries in Central Asia, on which the overall security in the region depends in many ways.

Another Turkic country participating in the CSTO is Kyrgyzstan. It is widely believed that the main force that keeps Kyrgyzstan in the CSTO is the need for Russia. As noted by V. B. Bogatyrev, progress in the issues of the Russian military base and Russia's participation in the development of the energy potential of Kyrgyzstan, the write-off of public debt significantly changes the attitude to the CSTO, creating prospects for Bishkek's participation in the work of this military-political Association at a new level. The Russian leadership's decision to transfer $ 1.1 billion worth of weapons, equipment and military equipment to Kyrgyzstan is also working in this direction [9]. It is possible that the strengthening of the role of Russia and the CSTO in the formation of military standards in Kyrgyzstan led to the intention of this country to cooperate with NATO in the framework of non-military programs.

At the same time, it is widely believed in Kyrgyzstan that NATO can ensure the country's security. Moreover, there is experience of Kyrgyzstan's appeal to the CSTO for help in 2010, during the inter-ethnic conflict in the South of the country. On the part of the CSTO, the events in Kyrgyzstan were regarded as an internal affair of this country. The potential of the CSTO can be used by the decision of the CSTO Council against external aggression against one of the CSTO members. The end result of the CSTO, Kyrgyzstan has provided technical and humanitarian assistance, but did not go for military intervention. (Никитина Ю.2009).

Kyrgyzstan chaired the CSTO in 2013. The action plan from the Kyrgyz side included countering modern threats and challenges, strengthening the CSTO's position, ensuring border security, and cooperation in emergency situations. In fact, within the framework of the CSTO, it was decided to create a security belt in the Central Asian region, where one of the important components is to ensure border security and strengthen borders (primarily of countries in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan). Kyrgyzstan made a proposal to create such a belt.

Uzbekistan was one of the initiators of the creation of the collective security Treaty within the CIS. Uzbekistan's withdrawal in 1999, along with Georgia and Azerbaijan, from the military Treaty of the CIS countries can be explained by their disagreement with the strengthening of Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space through military cooperation. Another reason is the aggravation of relations between the participants of the DCB: Georgia and Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Western sanctions against Uzbekistan after the Andijan events, the events in Kyrgyzstan, and the continued build-up of Russia's military presence in the region led to the adjustment of Uzbekistan's foreign policy and its return to the CSTO in 2006. At the same time, the Uzbek side refrained from participating in many CSTO projects, in particular, it concerns cooperation in the military and military-technical spheres.

There is an opinion among experts that the suspension of Uzbekistan's participation in the CSTO in 2012 may mean that Tashkent has finally decided on its foreign policy orientation. According to B. akhmedkhanov, Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CSTO will have virtually no consequences for the organization, since the role played by Uzbekistan in it is not a key one. (Ахмедханов Б.2001).

It is clear that Azerbaijan is not going to return to the CSTO, since Armenia is a traditional partner and ally of Russia.

The CSTO plays an important role in the multilateral diplomacy of the post-Soviet Turkic countries. But not all Turkic republics are now part of this organization, where Russia is the main pillar. Despite the diversification of ways and mechanisms for ensuring security, according to most experts, military-political cooperation between the countries of the region is based on the Russian factor, as the main guarantor of security in Central Asia. (А. Богатурова 2011).

It is necessary to mention another international organization, which includes the Turkic countries. This is the Shanghai cooperation organization, the Declaration on the establishment of which was signed at the meeting of 6 States (Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) in Shanghai on June 15, 2001. At the summit in St. Petersburg on June 7, 2002, the SCO Charter was adopted, which is the basic Charter document that defines the goals, principles, structure and main activities of the organization.

The results. For the Turkic countries of the Central Asian region, their participation in the SCO largely contributes to the discussion and solution of problems of security, economic, transport, and energy cooperation. The SCO plays an important role in ensuring international security and in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Kazakhstan was the Chairman of the SCO from June 12, 2010 to June 15, 2011. Strengthening regional and global security has become the country's top priority as SCO Chairman. Kazakhstan has made a significant contribution to the development of the anti-Drug strategy of the SCO member States for 2011-2016, which was approved at the SCO anniversary Summit in Astana.

In Kyrgyzstan, the SCO is considered one of the most important mechanisms for ensuring regional security and stability. Kyrgyzstan was the first to call for the creation of an anti-terrorist structure in the SCO.

Along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, another Turkic country participates in the SCO – Uzbekistan. As you know, the SCO's priorities are the fight against three evils: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. For this purpose, the headquarters of the regional anti-terrorist structure (rats) was opened in Tashkent in 2004.

The similarity of security threats for the three Turkic States participating in the Shanghai organization creates a platform for their cooperation. The main purpose of the SCO for the Turkic States is to strengthen regional security by improving the mechanism of multilateral consultations and agreements, in which all regional actors participate.

The SCO's interaction with the CSTO and NATO is of great importance. The Turkic member States of the SCO are also participants in the Meeting on interaction and confidence-building measures in Asia (CICA), the idea of which was put forward by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev at the 47th session of the UN General Assembly in 1992. CICA is an international organization on the Asian continent that deals with issues of Asian and regional security. The CICA is not an international organization, but a forum for political dialogue and consultation. Today, the CICA unites 24 countries with a population of more than 3 billion people. The CICA includes almost all Turkic States: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.

During Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the CICA, first of all, an effective international structure was launched, concrete work was started on all five areas of cooperation, and work on institutionalization was completed when the Secretariat, a permanent administrative body, was created in 2006. The government of the Republic of Kazakhstan has an interdepartmental working group on strengthening the CICA.

On June 8, 2010, the 3rd CICA summit of heads of state and government was held in Istanbul (Turkey), where the Declaration "Building a joint approach to interaction and security in Asia"was adopted. The participants considered issues of strengthening of trust between the members of the CICA.

The role of the CICA as a mechanism for multilateral diplomacy, including that of the Turkic countries, is to expand cooperation through the development of multilateral approaches to promoting peace, security and stability in Asia. It is necessary to note the significant role of Kazakhstan in initiating, developing and strengthening this forum.

Conclusion.

Given the above, we can say that the current issue of foreign policy of the new Turkic countries is, first of all, ensuring their national security. In this context, the foreign policy strategy of the Turkic States should ensure national military construction, develop a certain line of conduct in resolving conflict situations, and protect their own borders and interests. One of the ways to achieve this goal is the participation of Turkic countries in international regional associations and organizations of military and political cooperation. The participation of Turkic countries in both European and Asian regional organizations, as well as cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic military-political structure, indicates that the leadership of the Turkic States is aware of their place and role in global geopolitical and cultural-historical processes that Express the relationship between Western and Eastern civilization.

It should be noted that the Turkic countries participate both in consultative multilateral mechanisms (CICA) and in structures directly aimed at resolving issues related to the security of these countries (for example, in the SCO, cooperation with NATO), in military-political structures (CSTO).

Bilateral cooperation and partnership within the framework of the CSTO, SCO, CICA, OSCE and other regional organizations should be the Foundation for increasing joint efforts to strengthen and ensure the security of the new Turkic countries. For the most part, the Turkic States have to either balance between blocks or make a choice between them. At the present stage, the multi-vector foreign policy of the Turkic countries is growing.

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ВОЕННО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО НОВЫХ ТЮРКСКИХ СТРАН В РАМКАХ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫХ ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ

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ANALYSIS OF GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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Annotation. This article examines the problems of increasing competition between the United States and China for economic and political leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of the article is to conduct a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the priorities of the us and China's foreign policy strategies. Traced the definition of the basic interests of China and USA and means of their implementation, analysis of the economic, geopolitical and military-strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region and its countries

Key words: USA, China, Asia-Pacific, political and economical interests, trade

Introduction

Transformation of international system at the beginning of the XXI century is all-encompassing and deep in character. Principal factor shaping the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of XXI century is the rise of Asia Pacific region and its countries. States with complex national strength are rapidly growing, the geography of national interests is expanding, and international influence of some countries, China and the United States in particular, is increasing. Today China's interests are not limited with exclusively domestic economic development and participation in East Asian affairs, but they are becoming broader in scope and projected on almost all subregions of the Asia Pacific. Moreover, foreign policy of this largest East Asian state is reaching a qualitatively new level. Chinese leadership is actively taking participation in shaping the international agenda, creating new mechanisms and institutions of global governance. With support of a number of other new centers of influence (India, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian nations), Beijing is increasing pressure to revise the existing decision rules in the Western and US-controlled global financial and trade institutions.

Goals

The article analyzes the political and economic interests of the United States and China in the Asia Pacific region which plays a significant role in the system of international relations in the new conditions. Each state has its own economic interests in the region which are determined by relations with other countries. The US and China have different priorities in the region related to political and military interests

Methods

Theoretical and methodological basis of the article is an analytical work of foreign authors that examines the main principles of foreign policy of the United States and China in this region, taking into account the international situation. Now soft power is very relevant in the system of international relations and China uses it for its own purposes. The article uses historical-comparative and static methods and event analysis to analyze the interests and priorities of the two States

Discussion

Leaders of these two states in their public speeches focus on potential areas of bilateral cooperation, on presence of a wide range of common global and regional interests, on the willingness of both countries to develop partnerships. However, the official rhetoric of leadership cannot hide serious contradictions inherent in American-Chinese relations, which are systematically manifested and lead to tensions and crises in the interaction of two superpowers. Underlying causes of these contradictions are the fundamental differences in political regimes, ideologies, value systems and economic development models, lack of strategic trust between them as well as consequently absolutely different geopolitical goals and interests towards several regions, including Asia Pacific.

Konkurentnye strategii Pekina i malyh stran ASEAN v Yuzhno-Kitajskom more" by Garri M. is also devoted to the analysis of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in which China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are involved, as well as the prospects for their evolution. Priority is given to assessing the goals and strategies of parties to this conflict. It is shown that due to the disparity between long-term goals of the opposing sides, they have practically no areas of interest - common or parallel, on which it would be possible to reach a compromise through negotiations [1].

With a view to collect data on the Asia-Pacific region, "Aziatsko-Tihookeanskij region: mify, illyuzii i real'nost" by Arin O. A. was examined to analyze its geostrategic significance and role in international relations. In this monograph, for the first time in domestic and foreign scientific literature, an attempt has been made to dispel the myth of the Asia-Pacific against the background of analysis of almost all pressing and controversial problems of East Asia. For each of them, the author puts forward his own concepts, which do not coincide with generally accepted approaches and views. The given book also explores theoretical foundations of national interests and security of the United States, China and Japan, coupled with the real policies of these states in the region being analyzed [2].

Particularly represented in such works as China's offensive in Southeast Asia: regional architecture and the process of Sinization by Suehiro A.

During the 1990s, China had aimed at constructing good relations with neighboring countries including Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. After the start of external offensive strategy in 2001, China began to accelerate its economic involvement in Asian countries in general, and ASEAN countries in particular. At the same time, China has attempted to create China-led institutional framework and to make the region suitable to Chinese existence. This activity is called "the process of Sinicization" in this article. To explore the process of Sinicization in reference to China's relations with CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam) and Thailand, or China's relations with ASEAN members, the author examines in detail two cases of the Greater Mekong Subregion Scheme or GMS (since 1992) and the Nanning-based China-ASEAN EXPO or CAEXPO (since 2004) in addition to comparison of Chinese and Japanese economic involvement in Southeast Asia [3].

Favorable geographical position and rich natural resource potential in many respects determined the importance of Asia Pacific and its subregions as a strategically important part of the world. In particular political and economic success of Southeast Asian countries was largely due to their membership in ASEAN. Initially consisting of only five states, this organization was able to overcome the consequences of imperialist and civil wars, survive the collapse of bipolar system of the world order and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Today, the given Association has become a center of a regional political and economic architecture and an effective tool for promoting peace and stability in the Asia Pacific Region (APR). More than 630 million people live in the ASEAN states, and their combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exceeds 2.55 trillion dollars. According to some estimates, they may become the 4th economy in the world by

2050, already occupying the 7th position now. It is worth noting that the GDP growth rate is about 5% per year and 24% of the total turnover falls on mutual trade - this is the third largest indicator in the world after the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) [4].

The given region is rich in natural resources, which occupy an important place in foreign trade of several countries. For example, Malaysia is the leading global exporter of rubber, while Indonesia is a producer of precious woods and palm products, and economy of Brunei is entirely built around the export of oil and gas. At the same time, industrial goods and processing products have come to the first places in generating income for most countries during last 10–15 years. Singapore is one of the most economically developed countries in Southeast Asia region - it receives main income from transport logistics, financial and "digital" services, etc. One of the most important factors for economic development of Southeast Asian nations is a potential of the South China Sea. International maritime communications pass through its water areas, including the transportation of hydrocarbons from the Middle East (up to 80% of imports from China and Japan). The Strait of Malacca annually passes over 70 thousand merchant ships and 20 thousand tankers. According to preliminary estimates, total deposits of oil in the South China Sea amount to 30 billion tons, and natural gas - at least 16 trillion cubic meters. Moreover the South China Sea basin is on the fourth place among the largest fishing areas of the world [5].

Main trade routes of China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and other actively trading countries intersect in Southeast Asia. Over the past ten years, foreign investment activity in this subregion of the APR has also significantly increased. In addition, foreign trade of the Association members for the same time increased by 3 times. According to McKinsey, in case of successful implementation of the idea of ASEAN economic community and the full removal of barriers and restrictions, these nations will be able to generate an additional 280 - 625 billion dollars GDP annually by 2030 [6].

Despite significant prospects for economic development, ASEAN is also facing factors capable of blocking the implementation of a significant part of initiatives. The main difficulty is a choice of partners for broader integration. Even after the refusal of US President D. Trump to participate in Transpacific Partnership, some ASEAN members still hope for successful implementation of this format. At the same time, negotiations on joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership - idea promoted by the People's Republic of China (PRC), are also going on quite difficult - Southeast Asian states are trying to defend their own economic interests, not agreeing to unify the standards [7].

China is a main investor and trading partner of ASEAN countries, ranking third in terms of investment in their economies. Mutual trade turnover reached 515 billion dollars at the end of 2017, having increased by 13.8% compared to 2016 [8].

According to some estimates, the volume of accumulated capital investments of Chinese companies in Southeast Asian states reaches 120 billion dollars. It should be borne in mind that while analyzing Chinese investments, official statistics often give them an underestimate, since investors from the PRC, as a rule, create front companies with registration of ownership as local huaqiao. If this circumstance is taken into account, the direct investment of Chinese business in only five countries of the region (Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) reached $69 billion during 2004–2015 [9].

The volume of trade and investment has grown rapidly since 2000s, when China began to implement actively the strategy for its producers to enter foreign markets . In order to accomplish this task and to promote the "literate and effective" investments of Chinese companies, the *China Industrial Overseas Development & Planning Association* was created in 2004 . It reports to the National *Development and Reform* Commission of the *People's Republic of China*. During this time, the volume of bilateral trade increased by almost 13 times (compared to 2000) , and the

volume of investments - by 9.3 times (compared to 2004). Despite the fact that Chinese investments grew in nominal terms in all Southeast Asian states after 2004, they dominate not everywhere in the total volume of foreign direct investment (Table 4). For example, in Thailand and Vietnam, the share of Chinese business in FDI is 7,8 and 6% respectively. Worth to note that Japan is a key investor in these countries. China is a main investor for Cambodia (22%) and Laos (25%) [10].

The growth of mutual trade and investment was facilitated by fact that China became a strategic partner of the ASEAN in 2003. In January 2010, ASEAN- China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) Agreement on creation of a free trade zone between the PRC and ASEAN members came into effect. This was preceded by adoption of the Asia Debt Relief Initiative in 2002, which dealt with debt cancellation and financial assistance to poor countries located on Indochina Peninsula. Meanwhile the Chinese province of Yunnan which borders with Southeast Asia (4,600 km of the common border with Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) dramatically expanded the format of its industrial exhibition, held annually in Kunming to attract business partners from Indochina states. The Chinese "Opening Border Regions" strategy, which has been implemented since 2001, promoted bilateral cooperation as well. Another area of Chinese expansion was a development of the Greater Mekong subregion (GMS). Economic cooperation program for projects in the Mekong Valley is divided into three phases. During the first stage (1994–2007), 34 projects worth about $10 billion dollars were implemented. They were financed both by the Asian Development Bank - 34.7%, and at the expense of cash infusions of the PRC - 27.2%. It is important to note that main levers of influence in Asian Development Bank (ADB) are in the hands of Japan and the United States. As of December 31, 2017, the largest shareholders of ADB were Japan and the USA (15.607% each) as well as the PRC (6.444%), India (6.331%) and Australia (5.786%). The bank itself is headed by Japanese Takehiko Nakao.

At the second stage (2008–2012), during which 110 projects worth 15 billion dollars were implemented, the Chinese share in investments increased to 32.2%, while the ADB share fell to 22.1%. At the third stage (2014–2018), as of May 2016, 59 projects worth $ 30.06 billion dollars were implemented. Meanwhile the share of investors from the PRC grew to 62%, and the ADB contribution decreased to 17.4%. Given the involvement of Chinese business and government in this project, it can be concluded that the Greater Mekong subregion contributes to gradual incorporation of economies into Chinese infrastructure development program.

On March 31, 2018, the 6th GMS Summit was held in Hanoi on the theme "Developing a 25-year cooperation, building an integrated, sustainable and prosperous Greater Mekong". Following the meeting, the Hanoi Action Plan for 2018–2022 (with the Investment Plan for 2022) was adopted, which in its turn include 227 projects with a total value of 66 billion dollars [11].

Another project contributing to the expansion of Chinese business in these countries is annual industrial exhibition The China-ASEAN Expo (CAEXPO) in Nanning (Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region of China), which has been held since 2004. This city was not accidentally chosen by Chinese authorities: it is located near the border with Vietnam (174 km from Hanoi), and it also houses the Guangxi Industrial Development Zone. The purpose of Sino-ASEAN Industrial Exhibition is to promote Chinese products in countries of Southeast Asia. This is evidenced by the amount of contracts concluded by Chinese companies - 16 billion dollars, or 62% of all contracts in 2014 [12].

Chinese the Belt and Road Initiative and capital investment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are also actively promoting the expansion of Chinese business in developing states.

The successes of economic development and strengthening of China's international influence in recent years have led Beijing to a rethinking of its role in the world and a revision of

its domestic and foreign policy priorities. Economic strategy of the PRC today consists of “Go Out” policy, which helps to establish relations with other countries, primarily in interests of expanding the access of their enterprises to foreign markets. The Chinese initiative to form the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) seems to respond to a new challenges facing the country in implementation of "reform and opening up" policies. The SREB initiative was complemented by a maritime component — the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR), the idea of co-constructing which was proposed to ASEAN member states in October 2013 by Xi Jinping. Both components - the SREB and the MSP - were combined into a common strategic concept called “The Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), which serves as one of the main directions of the PRC's economic and foreign policy [13].

Developing relations with Southeast Asian nations remains one of the top priorities in Chinese foreign policy paradigm, which is dictated by security interests and idea of creating a “belt of peace, stability and common prosperity” along the perimeter of the PRC borders. It is designed to provide favorable conditions for economic development of state in the long term. One of the most effective tools for its implementation in relation to Southeast Asia is an initiative of Maritime Silk Road, which allows China to solve a number of important complex tasks of a political, economic, military and cultural nature .

Obviously, the emergence of MSR concept was, to a large extent, a response measure towards Washington’s “Pivot to Asia” policy pursued since 2011, aimed at deterring China, increasing control over the sea transport routes through which resources and fuel as well as products of Chinese industry are supplied there. Moreover according to the PRC leadership, implementation of the Maritime Silk Road strategy will help alleviate the outlined disagreements between China and its neighboring countries related the escalation of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Enhancing multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should contribute to improving the regional foreign policy climate. Cultural and humanitarian cooperation within the framework of this initiative (tourism, student exchanges, "people-to-people diplomacy", etc.) will allow China to further increase its "soft power" on Southeast Asian territories.

Substantially significant part of this project is its impact on internal political situation in the country. Creation of the Silk Road is designed to solve several problems. Firstly, investments in promising projects are effectively targeted, which should be paid back politically and economically. Second, the problem of underdevelopment is still being addressed particularly on western and central territories of China. Thirdly, new jobs are created in public corporations in the course of implementing infrastructure projects . The Chinese side places a special emphasis on economic aspect of the MSR, which also serves as an instrument of Chinese "soft power", designed to increase an attractiveness of the PRC for countries of South and Southeast Asia. An important goal of this initiative is to redirect the flow of goods exports and capital to those states that have not yet become active participants in world trade.

Control over the sea and land routes of the Silk Road allows to ensure the energy security of China, since, as the largest importer of energy resources in the world, it largely depends on maritime supplies and the safety of maritime transport corridors. The given project reduces logistic costs China, attracts investments for countries through which it passes and reduces the huge gap in infrastructure development between ASEAN nations. Ultimately, safe, uninterrupted and highly efficient sea transport routes are created with a nodal points in the most important ports .

It is assumed that participating countries will implement the matching plans for construction of infrastructure and creation of a technical standards system, gradually forming the basic infrastructure network between Asian subregions. As a result, a single mechanism for transport coordination and multimodal transport will be obtained, which will gradually develop standard rules to facilitate international transportation. The initiative provides for the joint

construction of ports, an increase in the number of sea routes, and strengthening cooperation in the field of maritime logistics and security at sea.

The given Chinese initiative is devoid of rigid restrictive frameworks and, according to economists, is the most gentle and flexible modern partnership. Its implementation implies an exchange of views between participants on the ways of economic development, which will reveal potential conflict points, eliminate them and form joint development strategies taking into account the economic, political, legal practices of participants of this project. China emphasizes that the “Belt and Road” is not an integration structure, not a regional or international organization, but an initiative of mutually beneficial cooperation and joint development, which makes it possible to call it an open partnership model.

However, China does not build the Silk Road from scratch. A number of facilities on the MSR route are separate, independent projects of the Asia-Pacific nations, already partially implemented. Basically China aims to integrate the Maritime Silk Road project into the regional infrastructure network, which, on the one hand, should allow saving on capital investments, and on the other, avoid accusing China of becoming a monopolist in this region. Nevertheless, in the course of promoting this project, the country faced a number of difficulties, one of them was the fear of Asia Pacific states (for instance, Vietnam and the Philippines) over the Beijing growing influence. The growing imbalance in trade and development, in their understanding, will lead to the formation of dominant "Chinese-centric" order in this region. However, benefits that these countries share in this project outweigh potential risks.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Silk Road Investment Fund and China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund provide financial support for the MSR. Project provides great opportunities for nations to develop infrastructure: ports, highways and railways, airfields, thermal power plants, pipelines, etc. Thus alternative land corridors for the delivery of goods instead of the sea route are being created in parallel.

The successes of Belt and Road megaproject, as well as China’s bilateral economic cooperation with the Asia-Pacific developing countries objectively lead to a diminishing American role there. In addition, the US withdrawal from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and “America First” policy announced by D. Trump initially caused serious concern in most Asia-Pacific developing countries about Washington’s future plans in this region. However, in December 2017, as it was already mentioned, the US administration introduced a new National Security Strategy. Given document emphasizes the great interest of the United States in development of bilateral relations with many countries of the world, including South, East and Southeast Asian nations. In particular, Strategy points out high significance of the alliance with the Philippines and Thailand, as well as the markets of these states. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are positioned as important partners of the United States in the field of economy and security. ASEAN is presented as one of the central elements of emerging Indo-Pacific region (IPR) and a significant political platform "to promote a world order based on freedom" [14].

The concept of "Indo-Pacific region", which includes part of the Indian and Pacific oceans, covering South-East Asia, has replaced the traditional term "Asia-Pacific Region". In recent years, this concept has become frequent in strategic planning documents of the United States and India. Probably, the “alliance of four” will be a basis and backbone elements of Indo – Pacific Region (IPR): Japan, Australia, India and the United States. In the near future, countries of Southeast Asia can be connected to them, forming a kind of "second round-tour" of the Indo-Pacific region. By attracting these countries in order to form IPR they will connect subregion to a new megaproject, which probably claims to be an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road. The fact that the United States, India, Japan and Australia are discussing their own infrastructure plan became known in February 2018 . Thus, in the “alliance of four” economic development will be

placed on a par with security issues. Today, Trump's foreign policy style in relation to developing countries of the region is focused on building mainly bilateral relations. In particular special attention is paid to the development of relations with leading states: China, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia, and from developing countries - Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Although ties between the Philippines and the United States went through a cooling period in the second half of 2016, they warmed somewhat after US President Donald Trump took office. He supported efforts of his Philippine counterpart in the war against the drug trafficking. USA has historically remained as a main ally of islands in the western world. Both countries are linked by broad economic, social and military relations.

According to the 2016 Census Bureau, about 4 million Filipinos live in the United States [15].

This is the second largest group among Asian Americans. At the same time, it is the largest Filipino diaspora in the world. Despite the ominous pre-election rhetoric against the United States (including a promise to close American bases within two years), President R. Duterte did not decide to reconsider or break close relationship with Washington. It is important to note that the pro-American orientation of the majority of Filipinos played a large role in this situation . The fact that one of the main factors of sustainable economic growth on the islands (over 6% per year) is Filipinos' remittances from the United States — about $ 20 billion annually — remained a holding back moment for country's leadership [16].

However, authorities of the island nation have certain claims to Washington. In particular, they are dissatisfied with the fact that the United States supplies outdated military equipment and weapons to the Philippines. For Manila, it is not a secret that Washington's military assistance is often indicative in nature and is carried out in order to maintain its military presence in this country.

In April 2014, these two countries signed a 10-year Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), under which the US military was given a right to freely use the Philippine bases to deploy their forces. The EDCA reaffirmed all points of previous military agreements, including the Mutual Defense Treaty (August 30, 1951). In January 2017, US plans to modernize five Filipino military bases and build new buildings on their territory as part of EDCA were announced [17].

In the fall of 2017, Americans assisted the government forces for six months, freeing city of Marawi on Mindanao island from the ISIL militants. After this, the Philippines Minister of Defense announced that he would return to the previous schedule of Balikatan bilateral military exercises in 2018, after R. Duterte had considerably limited their scope.

In 2016, the volume of trade in goods and services of the United States with the Philippines was approximately $27 billion, while export accounted for $11 billion, and imports - $16 billion. Thus trade deficit of America with the Philippines in 2016 reached $5 billion. The Philippines ranks 31st among the country's trading partners. According to the US Department of Commerce [18].

Exports of goods and services to the Philippines in 2015 supported approximately 58 thousand jobs on these islands (among them 42 thousand due to the export of goods and 16 thousand due to the export of services). US foreign direct investment in the Philippines was $6 billion in 2016, which is 9.4% more than in 2015. American companies are investing in industrial enterprises, non-bank holding companies and wholesale trade in the republic. Philippine FDI in the United States in 2016 amounted to 1.4 billion dollars, which is 20.5% more than in 2015 [19].

The United States has serious economic and commercial interests in Indonesia as well. This country is considered by Washington as a key to ensuring regional security due to its geo-

strategic position, since it is located at the intersection of vital international maritime transport routes. Relations between Indonesia and the United States as a whole are developing in a positive way. Position of Indonesian leadership seems to be important to Washington in solving political issues in the Asia Pacific, including territorial problem of the South China Sea. The United States and Indonesia signed a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement in 2010, and conducted the U.S.-Indonesia Strategic Partnership 5 years later. Hence the cooperation of two countries was extended to issues of regional and global importance [20].

Additionally the United States is a major supplier of military equipment in Indonesia, including Boeing AH-64 Apache and F-16 Fighting Falcon helicopters. As of January 2018, Indonesia is exploring the possibility of acquiring another 48 F-16 aircraft worth $4.5 billion.

Over the past decade, trade between these two states increased by 53% to 25 billion dollars, while American exports to Indonesia almost doubled and amounted to about 6 billion dollars in 2016. At the same time the American trade deficit with Indonesia remains at $13 billion. Main categories of US exports to Indonesia include soybean, airplanes, equipment, food products and animal feed, cotton. Export of US services to Indonesia has grown by more than 70% over the past decade and now stands at $2.5 billion. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) from US companies to Indonesia reached $13.5 billion in 2015 - an increase of $ 1.6 billion over the year. In 2016, Indonesia was the 35th largest export market for the United States, and while the United States - the fifth largest trading partner of this archipelago.

Indonesia, the development plan for sea transport of which “Indonesia-Sea Axis of the World” fits well with the initiative of MSR, is also of interest to Chinese investors. At present, Beijing has confirmed its willingness to participate in the construction of 24 seaports and 15 airports, as well as in construction of 1,000 km of highways, laying 8,700 km of railway tracks and the construction of a power station with a capacity of 35 thousand Megawatts [21].

Speaking about China**,** Myanmar plays an important geopolitical role in its “Belt and Road” project, because it participates in two significant transport corridors. Port Yangon in Myanmar has been declared an intermediate point of MSR. China implemented a major infrastructure project for the construction of an oil pipeline there, which made it possible to somewhat reduce its dependence on supply of Middle Eastern oil through the Strait of Malacca. Currently, oil from countries of the Middle East or Latin America flows through an oil pipeline to Kunming (China) after unloading tankers in the port of Chauphyu (Myanmar). However, the oil pipeline cannot become a fully-fledged alternative to the sea transportation of oil due to its relatively low capacity. In this regard, China is developing a plan to create an additional railway corridor from Chauphyu to Yunnan Province [22].

This country also participates in the organization of China - Myanmar - Bangladesh - India economic corridor (Fig. 5), which consists of two routes - land and sea. Concept of reviving this branch of the Silk Road was voiced during the visit of Premier of the State Council of China Li Keqiang to India in May 2013. According to experts, the total cost of this project, including road, rail, water and air routes, can be at least $ 22 billion.

Main artery of this corridor is a land route - the Kolkata – Kunming highway, but a sea route is more competitive than the land route, since it shortens a distance from Sittwe (Myanmar) to Kolkata (India) by 1,328 km . By linking Kunming with the Myanmar port of Chou Phya, Bangladeshi Chittagong and Sonadia by road and rail, China provides access to the sea of its southern Yunnan province. As a result, it is possible to deliver energy from Africa and the Middle East, avoiding passage through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea.

Malaysia**,** due to its geographical position, plays a similar role in Chinese initiative. In this regard, it attracts increased interest from Chinese investors, as the Maritime Silk Road passes through the Strait of Malacca, and the expected increase in freight traffic will lead to an increase in demand for port services. Currently, China has invested heavily in four major port projects in

this country. Thus, in 2016, a consortium of three Chinese companies (Power China International, Shenzhen Yantian Port Group and Rizhao Port Group) signed a contract with a Malaysian partner to assist in the construction of a new deepwater port in the Malacca Strait - Melaka Gateway - worth more than 7 billion dollars. The project is scheduled for completion by the end of 2019.

In order to implement an ambitious project worth $2 billion to modernize the port of Penang, the Chinese port operators Shenzhen Yantian Port Group Co and Rizhao Port Group Co established a joint venture with Malaysian company KAJ Development in January 2017. Upon its completion, the given port will be able to handle up to 100 thousand ships a year and thus unload other ports of the Strait of Malacca [23].

Project of the International Port of Kuala Linggi, designed to handle oil tankers, has raised about $3 billion of Chinese investment. In the near future, the port will focus on bunker business . Currently, the port of Kuantan, which is mainly engaged in bulk cargo for nearby industrial areas, is expanding cargo and is building a new deep-water terminal to be used as a container port for cargo transshipment. The port is managed by Malaysian-Chinese consortium Kuantan Port Consortium Sdn Bhd as part of the local IJM Corp. (60%) and Chinese Guangxi Beibu Gulf International Port Group (40%). The consortium has a 30-year concession to manage, operate and develop the port. Chinese investment in modernization amounts to $177 million [24].

Obviously, these planned projects will bring great economic dividends to Malaysia, but are likely to have a negative impact on Singapore and its development prospects. New Malaysian ports will be more competitive, which will lead to a decrease in the volume of container cargo handling in Singapore and a decrease in its attractiveness as a global transit hub. But in any case, it will be beneficial to Chinese business since it will allow to strengthen its influence and position in this developing state.

Conclusion

At the present stage of development of international relations, the Asia-Pacific region is one of the most important economic centers of the world. During the second half of XX century, China was one of the claimants to hegemony in the above mentioned region. Using various economic and political levers China gained more and more influence. After the PRC (ahead of Japan) became the second largest economic power in the world, the confrontation between the United States and China became much worse. And as a result of the Asia Pacific, in particular, Southeast Asia has become one of the epicenters of this confrontation.

The American response to the growth of Chinese influence in this region and its expansive policy was not a mirror. Despite the superiority of the American economy on a global scale, Chinese economic influence even surpasses the American one in the Asian region. If we draw a parallel, the influence of China on countries of Asia Pacific is as strong as the influence of the United States in Latin America. One of the main steps that the United States is taking to implement is an establishment and expansion of military cooperation with key countries, as well as investment in the military infrastructure of the region. For instance, for the United States Vietnam has now become a country on which they rely in resisting the influence of the PRC. It can be proved with an agreements on military cooperation (consequently delivery and deployment of military-technical equipments as well as conducting military exercises) signed between the United States and several SEA states, including Vietnam. All of this are aimed at making it clear to the PRC government, whose side is occupied by the United States in territorial disputes (i.e. in the South China Sea), and also to demonstrate the firmness of American intentions. It is worth to note that the South China Sea nowadays is the most important commercial artery, and the lack of control over it for the United States, at least partially, will bring huge economic losses.

Economic part of the American policy is also of a great importance, since it is impossible to resist the growing influence of China, relying on using only military political mechanisms. It should not be forgotten that Trans-Pacific Partnership was a key American economic lever in Asia Pacific region. Despite the fact that Donald Trump has decided to withdraw from this agreement, there is a greater likelihood of the United States returning to participate in it. Summing up, today the US is not just forging military, political and economic cooperation with key countries of Asia Pacific at the bilateral level, but has plans to create a whole system of relations aimed at countering the growth of Chinese power in this supraregion.

The presented study was able to trace a huge difference in campaigns of these two powers, in defending their interests in the APR. If Chinese policy in relation to this region can be described as a policy of "economic expansion", and main methods used by Beijing include: investment, financial assistance and loans. Then in response to the growth of Chinese influence, a different approach was chosen by American government. Realizing its foreign policy strategy in this supraregion, the United States gives priority to military methods. Main mechanism resorted to by the US government was an establishment of military cooperation with several countries in order to use them to counteract the growth of Chinese economic and political influence. Which of the chosen strategies will ultimately be the most accurate, cannot be said at the moment, but it can be stated unequivocally that each of them is efficient in its own way and is the most important lever in the struggle for influence in this supraregion.

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